[J-148A-1995] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT BONITA KLINE CURTIS : No. 6 Eastern District Appeal : Docket 1994 : v. : Appeal from the Order of the : Court of Common Pleas of : Chester County, Domestic PHILIP H. KLINE : Relations Section, Entered : January 12, 1994 at No. 1012 N. : 1984, Granting Defendant's : Petition to Modify and APPEAL OF: COMMONWEALTH OF : Terminate Support PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF : PUBLIC WELFARE : ARGUED: September 21, 1995 OPINION JUSTICE ZAPPALL DECIDED: October 10, 1995 In Blue v. Blue, 532 Pa. 521, 616 A.2d 628 (1992), we declined to recognize a duty requiring a parent to provide college educational support because no such legal duty had been imposed by the General Assembly or developed by our case law. As a result of our Blue decision, the legislature promulgated Act 62 of 1993. Section 3 of the Act states: (a) General rule. -- . . . a court may order either or both parents who are separated, divorced, unmarried or otherwise subject to an existing support obligation to provide equitably for educational costs of their child whether an application for this support is made before or after the child has reached 18 23 Pa.C.S. ¤ 4327(a). The issue now before us is whether the Act violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.1 The Court of Common Pleas of Chester County held that it did, resulting in this direct appeal.2 The relevant facts are not in dispute. Appellee is the father of Jason, Amber and Rebecca. on July 12, 1991, an order of court for support was entered on behalf of Appellee's children. on March 2, 1993, Appellee filed a petition to terminate his support obligation as to Amber, a student at Kutztown University, and Jason, a student at West Chester University. After Act 62 was promulgated, Appellee was granted leave to include a constitutional challenge to the ACT as a basis for seeking relief from post- secondary educational support. In accordance with Pa.R.Civ.P. 235, the Attorney General was notified of the constitutional challenge to Act 62, but declined to participate in the litigation. on January 11, 1994, the trial court granted Appellee's petition to terminate support for Amber and Jason, concluding that Act 62 violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. After Appellee's petition to modify his post- secondary education support obligation was disposed of, the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) sought and was granted leave to intervene. DPW then filed a notice of appeal to this Court. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in pertinent part provides: No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The essence of the constitutional principle of equal protection under the law is that like persons in like circumstances will be treated similarly. Laudenberaer v. Port authority of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 436 A.2d 147 (1981). However, it does not require that all persons under all circumstances enjoy identical protection under the law. James v. SEPTA, 505 Pa. 137, 477 A.2d 1302 (1984), The right to equal protection under the law does not absolutely prohibit the Commonwealth from classifying individuals for the purpose of receiving different treatment, Robson v. Penn Hills School District, 63 Pa. Cmwlth. 250, 437 A.2d 1273 (1981), and does not require equal treatment of people having different needs. Houtz v. Commonwealth, Department of Public Welfare, 42 Pa. Cmwlth, 406, 401 Awed 388 (1979). The prohibition against treating people differently under the law does not preclude the Commonwealth from resorting to legislative classifications, Heieler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 43 Bet. 83, 67 L.Ed. 237 (1922), provided that those classifications are reasonable rather than arbitrary and bear a reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation. Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 512 Pa. 74, 515 A.2d 1358 (1986). In other words, a classification must rest upon some ground of difference which justifies the classification and have a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation. Id. Judicial review must determine whether any classification is founded on a real and genuine distinction rather than an artificial one. Equitable Credit and Discount Company v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 21 A.2d 53 (1941). A classification, though discriminatory, is not arbitrary or in violation of the equal protection clause if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived to sustain that classification. Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications Inc.; __U.S.__ , 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 sect. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). In undertaking its analysis, the reviewing court is free to hypothesize reasons the legislature might have had for the classification. Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications Inc.; Martin v. Unemployment Comp.Bd. of Review, 502 Pa. 282, 466 A.2d 107 (1983). If the court determines that the classifications are genuine, it cannot declare the classification void even if it might question the soundness or wisdom of the distinction, Equitable Credit and Discount Company v. Geier. We are also mindful of the different types of classifications and the standards according to which they are weighed: The types of classifications are: (1) classifications which implicate a "suspect" class or a fundamental right; (2) classifications implicating an "important" though not fundamental right or a "sensitive" classification; and (3) classifications which involve none of these. Id. Should the statutory classification in question fall into the first category, the statute is strictly construed in light of a "compelling" governmental purpose; if the classification falls into the second category, a heightened standard of scrutiny is applied to an "important" governmental purpose; and if the statutory scheme falls into the third category, the statute is upheld if there is any rational basis for the classification. Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 512 Pa. at 138, 516 A.2d 311 (citation omitted). In this instance, we are satisfied that Act 62 neither implicates a suspect class nor infringes upon a fundamental right. Neither the United States Constitution nor the Pennsylvania Constitution provides an individual right to post-secondary education. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides only that, "The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth." Article III, Section 14. Through the Public School Code of 1949, Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 ¤ 1-101 at seq., the General Assembly has established a statutory right to participate in public education and has established compulsory attendance requirements that in no case extend to post-secondary education. See 24 P.S. ¤13-1301 and 13-1326 - 13-1330. Apart from Act 62 , there appears to be no expression of policy regarding an individuals "entitlements to participate in post-secondary education. Likewise, the classification does not implicate an important though not fundamental right.4 Consequently, Act 62 must be upheld if there exists any rational basis for the prescribed classification. It is in this context that we review the Act's creation of a duty, and more significantly a legal mechanism for enforcement of that duty, limited to situations of separated, divorced, or unmarried parents and their children In applying the rational basis test, we have adopted a two-step analysis. See Plowman v. Commonwealth. Dpt. of Transportation, 535 Pa. 314, 635 A.2d 124 (1993). First, we must determine whether the challenged statute seeks to promote any legitimate state interest or public value. If so, we must next determine whether the classification adopted in the legislation is reasonably related to accomplishing that articulated state interest or interests. The preamble to Act 62 sets forth the legislature's intention "to codify the decision of the Superior Court in the case of Ulcer v. Sommerville, . . . and the subsequent line of cases interpreting Ulmer prior to the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Blue v. Blue . . . ." (Citations omitted). It also states: Further, the General Assembly finds that it has a rational and legitimate governmental interest in requiring some parental financial assistance for a higher education for children of parents who are separated, divorced, unmarried or otherwise subject to an existing support obligation. This latter statement begs the question of whether the legislature actually has a legitimate interest in treating children of separated, divorced, or unmarried parents differently than children of married parents with respect to the costs of post-secondary education. Appellant argues that with the passage of Act 62 the legislature may have chosen to treat the children of married families and divorced/unmarried families differently, not as preference towards the latter, but out of deference to the Commonwealth's strong interest in protecting the intact marital family unit from governmental interference. Alternatively, Appellant argues that the legislature may have determined that children in non-intact or non-marital families require educational advantages to overcome disadvantages attendant to the lack of an intact marital family. The critical consideration is whether either of these bases or any other conceivable basis for distinction in treatment is reasonable. Act 62 classifies young adults according to the marital status of their parents, establishing for one group an action to obtain a benefit enforceable by court order that is not available to the other group, The relevant category under consideration is children in need of funds for a post-secondary education. The Act divides these persons, similarly situated with respect to their need for assistance, into groups according to the marital status of their parents, i.e., children of divorced/separated/never-married parents and children of intact families. It will not do to argue that this classification is rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of obviating difficulties encountered by those in non-intact families who want parental financial assistance for post-secondary education, because such a statement of the governmental purpose assumes the validity of the classification. Recognizing that within the category of young adults in need of financial help to attend college there are some having a parent or parents unwilling to provide such help, the question remains whether the authority of the state may be selectively applied to empower only those from non-intact families to compel such help. We hold that it may not. In the absence of an entitlement on the part of any individual to post-secondary education, or a generally applicable requirement that parents assist their adult children in obtaining such an education,5 we perceive no rational basis for the state government to provide only certain adult citizens with legal means to overcome the difficulties they encounter in pursuing that end. It is tot inconceivable that in today’s society a divorced parent, e.g., a father, could have two children, one born of a first marriage and not residing with him and the other born of a second marriage and still residing with him. Under Act 62, such a father could be required to provide post-secondary educational support for the first child but not the second, even to the extent that the second child would be required to forego a college education. Further, a child over the age of 18, of a woman whose husband had died would have no action against the mother to recover costs of a post-secondary education, but a child over the age of 18, of a woman who never married, who married and divorced, or even who was only separated from her husband when he died would be able to maintain such an action. These are but two examples demonstrating the arbitrariness of the classification adopted in Act 62. In LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 624 A.2d 1350 (1993), the New Hampshire Supreme Court was faced with the issue of the constitutionality of a state statute regarding post-6econdary educational support. Initially, it must be noted that the Court decided this appeal based upon the New Hampshire constitution even though the appellant contended that the statute denied him equal protection under both the federal and state constitution. The underlying premise upon which the New Hampshire Supreme Court undertook its constitutional analysis of the post-secondary educational support scheme was that tab legislation created two classifications: married parents and divorced parents. The object of the legislation was to protect children of divorced parents from being unjustly deprived of opportunities they would otherwise have had of their parents had not divorced. The statute was promulgated to ensure that children of divorced families are not deprived of educational opportunities solely because their families are no longer intact. The result is a heightened judicial involvement in the financial and personal lives of divorced families with children that is not necessary with intact families with children. The New Hampshire supreme Court concluded that because of the unique problems of divorced families, the legislature could rationally conclude that absent judicial involvement, children of divorced families may be less likely than children of intact families to receive post-secondary educational support from both parents. With all due respect to our sister state, we must reject the New Hampshire Supreme Court's analysis in LeClair. The discriminatory classification adopted by our legislature is not focused on the parents but rather the children. The question is whether similarly situated young adults, i.e. those in need of financial assistance, nay be treated differently.6 Ultimately, we can conceive of no rational reason why those similarly situated with respect to needing funds for college education, should be treated unequally. Accordingly, we agree with the common pleas court and conclude that Act 62 is unconstitutional. The Order is affirmed. Mr. Justice Montemuro* files a Dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Cappy joins. *Mr. Justice Montemuro is sitting by designation, __________________ 1. The Appellee did not Assert that he was denied equal- protection under our state constitution. We note, however, that we would apply the same analysis and reach the same result under our state constitution. 2. 42 Pa.C.S. ¤ 741. 3. We are also guided by the principle that a strong presumption exists that a11 legislation promulgated by the General Assembly is constitutional. 1 Pa.C.S. ----. See also Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications Inc, supra; Plowman v. Commonwealth Dpt. Of Transportation, 535 Pa. 314, 635 A.2d 124 (1993). 4. Appellee admits that in the court below both he and his ex-wife argued that a "rational basis" test should be applied. He now argues that since the-trial court addressed the applicability of a "heightened scrutiny" test, that argument should not be considered waived. Since that issue was not raised before the trial court, we decline to address it. 5. Quaers whether the legislature could extend the statutory liability fox support of children applicable to all parents, 23 Pa.C.S. ¤ 4321(2)~ without regard to marital statue 23 Pa.C.S. ¤ 4323(b), to Include a duty to pay post-secondary education costs? 6. See also Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash.2d 592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978) , and Neudecker v. Neudecker, 577 N.E,2d 960 (Ind. 1991). ____________________________________________________________________ Also see Brief of Philip H. Kline at: http://www.peak.org/~jedwards/penn.htm