Terminating Child Support at 18 - Oregon


Oregon's Crocker v. Crocker update, 11-22-99

Brief on the Merits on Behalf of Petitioner on Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, 9-99


A message from Dennis Crocker's Attorney, Larry Gorin...

Greetings....

For your information:

On April 13, 1999, the Oregon Supreme Court granted Dennis Crocker's Petition for Review.

Mr. Crocker is asking the Oregon Supreme Court to review the decision of the Oregon Court of Appeals (CROCKER and CROCKER, 157 Or App 651, 971 P2d 469 (1998) that upheld the constitutionality of ORS 107.108, the Oregon statute that allows parents of young adults (between age 18 and 21 and who are attending college) to be compelled to pay "child support" to or on account of such young adults but ONLY if the parents are divorced from one another or were never married to one another. Parents of children in like circumstances but who are married to one another are exempt of the scope of the statute.

Mr. Crocker, a divorced father of three children (the eldest two of whom are now adults who are attending college), contends that ORS 107,108 is irrational, inherently discriminatory, and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the US Constitution as well as the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Oregon Constitution.

In substantial part, Mr. Crocker's argument is the same as that presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Curtis v. Kline, 542 Pa 249, 666 A2d 265, 269 (1995), which resulted in that state's highest court declaring the comparable Pennsylvania statute as unconstitutional. In 1997, Judge Paula Kurshner of the Multnomah County Circuit Court (in Portland, Oregon) agreed with Mr. Crocker's contention and declared the Oregon statute unconstitutional. Mrs. Crocker then appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court and upheld the constitutionality of the statute.

The Oregon Supreme Court is a 7-member court. A Petition for Review is granted if three (or more) of the justices vote to do so. The vast majority of such petitions are denied. Granting review does not mean that the justices voting to do so necessarily disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals. However, it does indicate that at least three of the justices feel that legal issue presented is of such significance and importance, and the possibility of legal error so apparent, that further review by the state's highest court is warranted.

Next step in the process is the preparation of an additional briefs (Mr. Crocker has 28 days in which to do so, with Mrs. Crocker then having 28 days to respond), to be then followed by oral argument before the Supreme Court in Salem, Oregon.

Your comments, input, support (moral as well as financial), etc., are most welcome.

Kindest regards,

Lawrence D. Gorin
Law Offices of L.D. Gorin
621 S.W. Morrison St., Suite 350
Portland, Oregon 97205
Phone: 503-224-8884 (afternoons, Pacific time)
Fax: 503-274-0818
E-mail: LGOregon@pcez.com



TIME LINE


National info regarding child support after age 18

JUDGE RULES CHILD SUPPORT FOR COLLEGE STUDENT UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The Associated Press 09/27/97 4:00 AM Eastern

PORTLAND, Ore. (AP) -- A Multnomah County judge has ruled it is unconstitutional to require a divorced Portland father to help pay for his daughter's college expenses.

Marianne Groom, a middle school teacher sued to have her ex-husband, Dennis Crocker, a grocery store manager, pay for part of the college expenses of their 18-year-old daughter, a freshman at Santa Clara (Calif.) University. Lawrence Gorin, Crocker's attorney, successfully argued that the law is unconstitutional because it awards special privileges to adult children whose parents are divorced compared to with those whose parents aren't.

"I think it's a rather gutsy and unpopular move for a judge," Gorin said. Judge Paula J. Kurshner could not be reached Friday to elaborate on her decision.

Under Oregon law, noncustodial parents can be required to pay child support until their children are 18. They can also can be required to help pay their children's expenses up to until age 21 if the child is in college at least half-time. The 1997 Legislature also required such students to maintain a C average.

Judges routinely include such requirements in child support orders, said Russell Lipetzky, chairman of the Oregon State Bar Association's family and juvenile law section.

For now, Kurshner's decision -- thought to be the first in the state -- applies only to Groom's case. But if her decision is upheld on appeal, Lipetzky said, other judges probably would follow the precedent.

Crocker said he has felt the law was unfair ever since a judge ordered him two years ago to help pay college expenses for the oldest of his three daughters. "I don't have a problem with supporting my children," he said. "I have a problem with the law treating me differently from married parents."

But Groom said she's taken on extra jobs and loans to pay for her daughters' college education. She worries what will happen with their youngest daughter, now 15, reaches college age.

"It's not fair for one parent to walk away," she said. Groom hasn't decided whether she will pursue an appeal. She said she's thinking over the attorney expenses and possible future effects on her other children's child support payments. She has 30 days to appeal.

Copyright 1997 Associated Press. All rights reserved.


Mom appeals ruling on support for college student

The Oregonian, Thursday, October 16, 1997

Lawrence Gorin (Crocker's attorney) own comments........

On Thursday, September 25, 1997, Multnomah County Judge Paula J. Kurshner declared Oregon's post-18 child support law (ORS 107.108) as unconstitutional, in violation of the equal protection provisions of both the Oregon and US constitutions.

Multnomah County Circuit Court case # 8706-64201.

Dennis J. CROCKER, Petitioner.
Atty: Lawrence D. Gorin

and
Marianne E. Crocker,
nka Marianne E. GROOM, Respondent.
Atty: Gregory B. Soriano.

Parties were divorced in 1987. Three children. At time to dissolution, children were 11, 8 and 5. Parties were granted joint custody, with father being ordered to pay child support to mother ($200 p/m p/c, for a total of $600 p/m).

In 1994, when the oldest child attained age 18 and entered college, mother ought modification of the dissolution decree. Relying on ORS 107.108 (Oregon's post-18 child support statute), mother asked the court to require father to pay additional support on account of the adult child's college expenses. Motion was granted. Support was increased to $942 p/m, of which $225 was specifically designated as father's contribution to the adult child's college expenses.

In 1997, when the parties' middle child reached age 18 and entered college, mother again sought modification of the child support obligation, this time seeking to impose additional support upon father for the two adult child, as well as additional support for the youngest child (now age 15).

The oldest child (now age 20) is attending Pepperdine University in California (estimated student cost: $28,150 per year). The middle child (age 18) has decided to attend Santa Clara University (estimated student cost: $26,226 per year).

In this latest proceeding, father filed a motion challenging the constitutionality of ORS 107.108. The matter came before Judge Paula J. Kurshner in Multnomah County on September 25, 1997.

Father argued that ORS 107.108 classifies young adults according to the marital status of their parents, establishing for one group a right to obtain a benefit enforceable by court order that is not available to the other group.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT: In cases where there is an intact family, with parents married and residing together, the statute has no application. In such cases, the parents have no legal obligation to provide support for adult children and adult children have no remedy for compelling such support. In essence, ORS 107.108 permits a burden to be imposed upon one class of citizens---divorced or separated parents---that cannot in like circumstances be imposed upon married parents residing together. Parents in this latter class are thus immune from such legal liability. Likewise, ORS 107.108 creates a privilege for one class of citizens---adult children of divorced or separated parents---that is not granted to children whose parents are married and residing together. In consequence, by establishing distinctions based upon the marital status of the parent, ORS 107.108 violates the equal protection clauses of both Oregon and United States constitutions.

Judge Kurshner agreed, declaring ORS 107.108 unconstitutional and dismissing mother's decree modification motion. It is anticipated that Judge Kurshner's ruling will be appealed to a higher court.


PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS


     IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON 
   
             FOR THE COUNTY OF MULTNOMAH 
  
                Family Law Department 
  
 In the Matter of the Marriage of  ) 
 				   ) 
 DENNIS JAMES CROCKER,             ) 
 				   ) No. 8706-64201  
                Petitioner,        ) 
 			           ) PETITIONER'S 
          and		           ) MOTION TO DISMISS 
                                   ) 
 MARIANNE ELLEN CROCKER            ) 
 (nka MARIANNE ELLEN GROOM),       ) 
 				   ) 
                    Respondent.	   ) 
  
                           MOTION 
 	Petitioner (father) objects to respondent's (mother's) 
 motion for an order requiring father to pay money for the 
 support of the parties' adult children.  Father moves for 
 judgment dismissing mother's motion. 
 	Father also moves for judgment against mother on 
 account of father's attorney fees and costs incurred 
 herein, as allowed by ORS 107.135. 
 	This motion is made on the grounds and for the reason 
 that ORS 107.108, the statute on which mother's motion is 
 premised, is unconstitutional. 
 
                   Points and Authorities 
 	ORS 107.108 
 	Oregon Constitution, Art. I,   20. 
 	US Constitution, Amendment XIV 
 	Curtis v. Kline, 666 A2d 265 (Pa 1995)  
  
  ORS 107.108: 
 	(1) In addition to any other authority of the court, 
 the court may enter an order against either parent, or 
 both of them, to provide for the support or maintenance of 
 a child attending school * * * [i]n a decree of annulment 
 or dissolution of a marriage or of separation from bed and board * * *. 
 	(2) * * *.  
 	(3) If the court provides for the support and 
 maintenance of a child attending school pursuant to this 
 section, the child is a party for purposes of matters 
 related to that provision. 
 	(4) As used in this section, "child attending school" 
 means a child of the parties who is unmarried, is 18 years 
 of age or older and under 21 years of age and is a student 
 regularly attending school, community college, college or 
 university, or regularly attending a course of 
 professional or technical training designed to fit the 
 child for gainful employment.  A child enrolled in an 
 educational course load of less than one-half that 
 determined by the educational facility to constitute 
 "full-time" enrollment is not a "child attending school." 
  
 Oregon Constitution, Art. I,   20: 
  
 	"No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or 
 class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon 
 the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." 
  
 US Constitution, Amendment XIV: 
  
 	"* * * No State shall make or enforce any law which 
 shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
 the United States; nor shall any State * * * deny to any 
 person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
 laws."    
  
                 Factual background 
 	Father is 41; mother is 40.  The parties were divorced 
 in 1987 after an 11 year marriage that produced three 
 daughters.  At the time of dissolution, the parties' 
 children were ages 11, 8 and 5.  They are now 20, 18 and 
 15. 
 	The parties' dissolution judgment provided for joint 
 custody of the children.  Father was ordered father to pay 
 child support to mother in the amount of $200 per child, 
 for a total of $600.  (Note: The 1987 judgment predated 
 the establishment of the Oregon Child Support Guidelines 
 by two years.) 
 	In July, 1995, with the parties' eldest daughter 
 having attained age 18, the support judgment was modified 
 upon motion filed by mother.  The court determined that 
 father had an obligation to support the adult daughter as 
 well as the two remaining minor children.  The court 
 premised support upon the Child Support Guidelines, 
 ordering father to pay $239 per month for each of the 
 three children, for a total of $717 per month.  Father was 
 also ordered to pay an additional $225 per month for the 
 adult child on account of said child's college expenses. 
 	In July, 1997, with the parties' #2 child having now 
 attained age 18, mother has again moved for support 
 modification, seeking to increase overall support and, 
 specifically, to now require father to pay support for the 
 two older children, both of whom are now adults. 
 
                     Legal Argument 
 Summary 
 	ORS 107.108 is unconstitutional.  It violates the 
 equal privileges and immunities clause of Article I, 
 section 20, of the Oregon Constitution as well as the 
 equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
 United States Constitution.   
  
 Discussion 
 	Under Oregon law, a person reaches the age of majority 
 at age 18.  From that age forward, a person becomes an 
 adult and has "all the rights and [is] subject to all the 
 liabilities of a citizen of full age."  ORS 109.510. 
 	Generally, absent physical or mental disability, the 
 legal obligation of parents to support their children 
 comes to an end when the children reach the age of 
 majority.  Thereafter, such children, having become 
 citizens of full age, have no legal right to compel 
 parental support, and parents have no duty to provide such 
 support. 
 	ORS 107.108 creates an exception that empowers the 
 court to compel parental support for adult children who 
 meet the definition of a "child attending school."  
 	The statute, by its own terms, is limited in its 
 application to only those cases involving "a decree of 
 annulment or dissolution of a marriage or of separation 
 from bed and board."  
 	Consequently, in cases where there is an intact 
 family, with parents married and residing together, the 
 statute has no application.  In such cases, the parents 
 have no legal obligation to provide support for adult 
 children and adult children have no remedy for compelling 
 such support. 
 	In essence, ORS 107.108 permits a burden to be imposed 
 upon one class of citizens---divorced or separated 
 parents---that cannot in like circumstances be imposed 
 upon married parents residing together.  Parents in this 
 latter class are thus immune from such legal liability. 
 	Likewise, ORS 107.108 creates a privilege for one 
 class of citizens---adult children of divorced or 
 separated parents---that is not granted to children whose 
 parents are married and residing together. 
 	In consequence, by establishing distinctions based 
 upon the marital status of the parent, a suspect 
 classification at best, ORS 107.108 violates the equal 
 protection clauses of both Oregon and United States 
 constitutions. 
  
 Curtis v. Kline 
	Perhaps most on point with the case before the bar is 
 Curtis v. Kline, 666 A2d 265 (Pa 1995) (copy attached 
 hereto). 
 	Curtis involved a father's challenge to the 
 constitutionality of 23 Pa Con Stat   4327(a), enacted by 
 the Pennsylvania legislature as Act 62 of 1993: 
 	"(a) General rule. --- * * * a court may order either 
 or both parents who are separated, divorced, unmarried or 
 otherwise subject to an existing support obligation to 
 provide equitably for educational costs of their child 
 whether an application for this support is made before or 
 after the child has reached 18 years of age." 
 	The Pennsylvania court recognized that the statute 
 "classifies young adults according to the marital status 
 of their parents, establishing for one group an action to 
 obtain a benefit enforceable by court order that is not 
 available to the other group."  666 A2d at 269.  So too 
 does ORS 107.108. 
 	The court noted that there is no entitlement on the 
 part of any individual to a post-secondary education, nor 
 is there any requirement that parents assist their adult 
 children in obtaining such education.  Accordingly, there 
 is no rational basis for the state government to provide 
 only certain adult citizens with legal means to overcome 
 the difficulties they counter in pursuing that end. 
 	Pennsylvania's Act 62 and Oregon's ORS 107.108 deal 
 with the same subject and have the same substantive 
 effect.  And both statutes suffer from the same 
 constitutional flaw:  they both establish legal privileges 
 for one class of citizens and impose corresponding legal 
 liabilities for another class that are not applicable to 
 other citizens similarly situated, doing so without 
 rational basis. 
 
 The "rational classification" 
 	While it may be inconvenient for an adult child to pay 
 his or her own way through school, there is no legal 
 reason why he or she should not do so if otherwise healthy 
 and able-bodied.  An adult child who attends college but 
 is capable of working is not in need of support merely 
 because he or she is in school. 
 	Nonetheless, it is anticipated that proponents of ORS 
 107.108 will argue that the statute's disparate 
 application is a rational distinction, as it protects 
 children of divorced parents from being unjustly deprived 
 of opportunities they would otherwise have had their 
 parents not divorced. 
 	The problem, of course, is the implicit assumption 
 that married parents will always provide financial support 
 for their adult children's college endeavors.  Such, of 
 course, is not the case.  Without directly so declaring, 
 ORS 107.108 appears to be premised upon the notion that 
 all parents of adult children attending college have an 
 obligation to support such children.  The statue then 
 affords a legal remedy to only one class of citizens: 
 adult children of divorced or separated parents. 
 	The discriminatory classification resulting from ORS 
 107.108 is not focused on the parents but rather on the 
 children.  Ultimately, the statute permits similarly 
 situated young adults, i.e., those in need of financial 
 assistance, to be treated differently.  There is no 
 rational basis why children similarly situated with respect 
 to needing funds for college education should be 
 treated unequally, but such is the result of
 ORS 107.108. 
 	Concomitantly, assuming there is a parental obligation 
 to financially assist adult children wishing to attend 
 college, there is no rational basis for exempting married 
 parents, otherwise able to pay but choosing or refusing to 
 do so, from court-ordered liability while at the same time 
 permitting a court-ordered liability to be imposed on 
 divorced parents who are willing or able to otherwise 
 accept the obligation. 
  
                        Conclusion 
 	The essence of the Fourteenth Amendment and of Article 
 I, section 20 is simple:  like citizens in like 
 circumstances are to be treated equally in the eyes of the 
 law.  ORS 107.108 violates this fundamental constitutional 
 principle.  The statute is unconstitutional and the court 
 should so recognize. 
 
 			Respectfully,

Dated:               , 1997.	LAWRENCE D. GORIN    OSB 73109 
 			Attorney for Petitioner 
  
 LAWRENCE D. GORIN
 Attorney at Law
 Law Offices of Lawrence Gorin
 350 American Bank Bldg.
 621 S.W. Morrison St.
 Portland, Oregon  97205
 
 Phone:   (503) 224-8884  (afternoons, Pacific time)  
 Fax:       (503) 223-0218